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ABSTRACT
Noise traders are agents whose theoretical existence has been hypothesized as a way of solving
certain fundamental problems in Financial Economics. We briefly review the literature on noise
traders. The is an entry for The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition (Palgrave















“Noise traders” are economic agents who trade in security markets for non-information-based 
reasons. The existence of noise traders was theoretically posited as a solution to the “no trade” or 
“no speculation” results of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Milgrom and Stokey (1982). These 
authors showed that it is impossible under most circumstances for an agent with superior 
information to profit from that information by trading. The intuition for the “no trade” result is as 
follows.  A buyer of an asset is prepared to pay a seller a price p only if the buyer believes that 
conditional on the seller agreeing to sell the asset, the value of the asset exceeds p.  But, then the 
seller, knowing this, is at least as well off keeping the asset. So, no one trades. 
 
But, we do observe trade in the world. Moreover, no trade is difficult to reconcile with the notion 
of asset market efficiency, in which prices allegedly contain all available information. If some 
agents produce costly private information and then trade on their private information, security 
prices will reflect some or all of the information and hence become more informationally 
efficient. To explain how informed traders can cover the costs of information production when 
they trade in securities markets, someone in the market must lose money trading against them. 
“Noise traders” or “liquidity traders” are the names given to the traders who lose money, on 
average, when they trade. Their trade then provides the subsidy to cover the cost of information 
production by the informed traders 
 
The idea that there are traders who systematically lose money trading securities leads to obvious 
questions. Do noise traders really exist? Who exactly are noise traders in reality? How do noise 
traders survive and persist when they are losing money trading?  
 
Rational Expectations and Efficient Security Markets 
 
In security markets, prices are alleged to reflect “all available information.”  But, how does this 
come about?  What is the information, and how is it aggregated into the price?  The concept of a 
Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE) gave formal content to the notion of “market 
efficiency,” which has been a central concept in financial economics for thirty years.   The idea is 
that if agents understand the economy, and understand how markets work, then they know that 
current prices reflect the information which is known to some agents, but maybe not to others. 
The uninformed agents understand the link between current prices and the information of the 
informed agents, and so can infer something about the information in prices.  When the prices 
that prevail in equilibrium coincide with what the uninformed agents can learn from the prices, 
and with the actions taken by the informed agents, who trade on their information knowing that 
the uninformed agents will infer (some or all) of the information, then the equilibrium is said to 
be a Rational Expectations Equilibrium. The idea that prices can convey information, in the sense 
of REE, is due to Lucas (1972).
1  Also, see Green (1973) and Radner (1979). 
 
But, when all the information of the informed agents is revealed, in a fully revealing REE, there is 
a problem if information acquisition is costly. Grossman (1976) considers a model of the stock 
market in which there are two types of traders “informed” and “uninformed.”  Informed traders 
take positions in the market based on their information.  Uninformed traders have no information, 
but know that prices will reflect the information of the informed traders. Grossman shows that the 
equilibrium prices aggregate and reveal the information perfectly, “but in doing this the price 
system eliminates the private incentive for collecting the information” (p. 574). Grossman is quite 
clear in identifying the paradox, but he also proposes a solution: 
 
                                                 
1 Grossman (1981) provides a brief intellectual history of REE.  Also, see Allen and Jordan (1998). 
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When a price system is a perfect aggregator of information it removes private incentives to 
collect information. If information is costly, there must be noise in the price system so that 
traders can earn a return on information gathering. If there is no noise and information 
collection is costly, then a perfect competitive market will break down because no 
equilibrium exists where one collects information.  (p. 574) [Emphasis added.] 
 
Beja (1976) also argues that REE and costly endogenous information acquisition are not 
compatible when agents are strategic and that consequently asset prices cannot be efficient. 
 
So, “noise” is required if agents are to acquire and trade on their costly information.  But, what is 
this “noise”?  The example of “noise” that Grossman (1976) points to is “an uncertain total stock 
of the risky asset” (p. 574).  Grossman (1977) describes “noise” simply as “many other factors” 
(p. 431).  The device of adding a random noise term to the aggregate supply of the asset is used in 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980).  They show that when information production is costly and there is 
noise in the asset supply, then some traders will acquire information and trade, but rational 
expectations prices will not be fully revealing. 
 
If there is uncertainty about the supply of the asset in the market, or about the level of demand, or 
about the risk aversion of other traders, then uninformed traders cannot be sure that prices reflect 
the information of the informed traders. The basic idea is that the uninformed traders confuse the 
private information with uncertainty about the other unknown variables. It is this additional 
uncertainty, or noise, which makes it possible for the informed traders to trade without perfectly 
revealing their information, and hence profit from its production. 
 
 The device of adding a noise term to aggregate supply does result in REE that are only partially 
revealing. Unfortunately, there were two problems with this approach as a general matter. First, 
the partially revealing REE models require somewhat special assumptions. Second, it was not 
clear what the proposed noise shock to aggregate supply really corresponds to in reality.
2  On the 
first point, Green’s (1977) nonexistence example uses a noise term on the traders’ endowments, 
and suggests that this will not be a suitable basis for a general approach. The general equilibrium 
literature did develop a number of generalizations, including for example the difference between 
the dimensions of the signals and the dimension of the prices. E.g., see Jordan (1983) and 
Ausubel (1990). Others have provided slightly different models that have partially revealing 
equilibria, but still there seems to be no general approach.  See, e.g., Allen (1981); and see Allen 





REE models assume that traders maximize expected utility with rational beliefs, where rational 
beliefs are defined to be consistent with the model itself.  There may be “noise,” but this was not 
viewed as emanating from incorrect beliefs.
3 In general, the notion of “noise” in the REE 
literature was somewhat vague and corresponded to a random error term added to the aggregate 
excess demand function. Understanding the role of “noise” appeared to require leaving the REE 
world and explicitly detailing the origin of “noise.” This was done by Kyle (1985). 
                                                 
2 There are other problems as well.  Hellwig (1980) pointed out that REE requires traders to act rationally 
with respect to information, yet they ignore the effect of their transactions on the price.  This was deemed 
the “Schizophrenia problem.”  Hellwig (1980), “…Grossman’s agents are slightly schizophrenic” (p. 478). 
3 There is the issue of how traders come to understand the model, that is, how they learn.  On that question 
see, e.g., Blume, Bray, and Easley (1982) and Blume and Easley (2004). 
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Kyle (1985) posited the existence of “uninformed noise traders who trade randomly” (p. 1315).
4 
Kyle identifies certain people as trading in a way which makes noise in the sense that their trade 
is not based on information. That is, he explicitly posits the existence of a class of agents – people 
-- who trade in a certain way so as to fulfill the role of “noise.” By explicitly introducing noise 
traders, Kyle focused attention on the details of the trading process. This became the foundation 
for the study of market microstructure.
5 Around the same time as Kyle, Glosten and Milgrom 
(1985) also introduced a similar class of agents:  “…we assume that there are informed investors 
and purely ‘liquidity’ traders” (p. 76).  Earlier Treynor (1971, under the pseudonym W. Bagehot) 
talked about “liquidity-motivated” traders. 
 
In REE models agents do not act strategically, the process of learning from prices occurs in 
equilibrium (as opposed to happening in real time), and the details of trading are treated in 
reduced form (agents submit demand functions to an auctioneer).  Kyle and Glosten and Milgrom 
changed this by specifying the trading process in a way that was not possible in REE models. In 
both papers there is a competitive marketmaker who receives orders from traders, at least one of 
which is superior information. The marketmaker must infer the information of the informed trader 
from the order flow. The marketmaker knows that some traders are privately informed, and that 
others are not trading based on any superior information (the noise traders). Inference about 
information occurs as the marketmaker learns by watching the order flow. Gradually, the 
marketmaker changes his price to reflect the information. 
 
Still, the noise traders in this new type of model were not well-motivated.  In fact, their motives 
are not explained. They earn a lower than average return than the informed agents, who earn an 
above average return. If the uninformed noise traders could at least buy the market portfolio, then 
they could earn the average return on the market. But, in fact they are not allowed to buy the 
market portfolio.  That is their root problem; see Dow and Gorton (1995). 
 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) suggest adding a noise term to agents’ risk exposures (their 
endowments). Risk-averse agents will then have an insurance motive for trading.  De Marzo and 
Duffie (1999) propose a model where different traders have different discount rates. Shocks to 
their discount rates provide an incentive to trade that other traders cannot distinguish from 
speculative trading intended to profit from information about the liquidation value of the asset.  
These papers solve the theoretical problem of finding a logically consistent model that can be 
used as a basis for economic analysis, including welfare statements, of markets with imperfect 
information revelation. Papers that have applied these models in various settings include Biais 
and Mariotti (2005) (for the De Marzo and Duffie model) and Dow and Rahi (2000, 2003) (for 
the Diamond Verrecchia approach).  
 
But is it really plausible to believe that there is a significant demand for individual stocks or 
bonds based on an insurance motive?  Stock indexes, exposure to the yield curve, or foreign 
currency could experience demand variations due to insurance motives, but there are close 
substitutes for individual stocks and bonds from a risk point of view.  Also, if investors do start 
off with different discount factors, one would expect them to trade these differences away.  
 
                                                 
4 In private correspondence, Kyle said that he did not originate the term “noise trading,” but attributes it to 
Sanford Grossman. 
5 Garman (1976) appears to have been the first to use the term “market microstructure.”  See Easley and 
O’Hara (2003) for a survey of the microstructure literature. 
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In other words, plausibly the demand curve for an individual asset should be almost perfectly 
elastic.  The price at which it becomes elastic, (given the prices of all other assets) should be 
almost identical for all agents.  Hence we revert to the situation where the asset has a unique 
fundamental value that all agents will agree on if they have the same information about the asset’s 
cash flows. So, the issue of who noise traders actually are remains an open question. 
 
 
Who are the Noise Traders? 
 
The details of the identity of noise traders or liquidity traders were initially left vague. For 
example, Glosten and Milgrom (1985) write of exogenous events motivating their trade, like “job 
promotions or unemployment, deaths or disabilities…” (p. 77).  These shocks were not well 
identified. Notably, noise traders were modeled as equally likely to be buying or selling 
securities, which while making models technically tractable, is counterintuitive. Exogenous 
reasons for needing money, and hence having to sell securities seems more natural than 
exogenous reasons for having to buy securities. 
 
The details of the identity of noise traders are important, because if noise traders are simply 
irrational there is clearly an incentive for “smart money” to take advantage of them, and 
eventually eliminate them from the market. The “market selection hypothesis” is the idea that 
irrational traders will eventually be driven out of the market.  Noise traders should not survive, 
and so cannot play the role envisioned for them. In fact, there is a long history of arguing that 
rational traders will eliminate irrational traders from the market, by taking their money when they 
trade at incorrect prices.  This process is what causes prices to be driven to (or close to) 
fundamental values. E.g., see Friedman (1953). 
 
Noise traders can only survive if there are some frictions or barriers preventing them from being 
eliminated by the smart money.  That is, there must be some limits to arbitrage. One possibility is 
that the smart money has a limited horizon over which trade can occur. With a limited horizon, 
the noise traders could cause losses to the smart money by moving prices further away from 
fundamentals.  This is the idea in DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldman (1990), Dow and 
Gorton 1994), and Shleifer and Vishny (1997). These papers argue that there are “limits to 
arbitrage,” providing an explanation for the persistence of noise trade. 
 
Still, the question remains: Who are the noise traders?  One view sees noise traders as individuals 
who are simply less than rational; they are subject to behavioral biases and fads. For example, 
Shiller (1984) argued that some investors rely on “popular models” which are wrong and also 
they can be subject to fads. Along the same lines, Shleifer and Summers (1990) wrote: “Some 
investors are not fully rational and their demand for assets is affected by their beliefs or 
sentiments that are not fully justified by fundamental news” (p. 19).  A large literature argues that 
individual investor trading is subject to a myriad of psychological biases, and that such 
individuals may use various heuristics, “popular models,” as the basis for their investment 
decisions. This literature is surveyed in Barberis and Thaler (2003). 
 
A second rationale for noise trading focuses not on individual investors, but on professional 
traders and money managers (“funds”) hired by principals/investors. Funds do not invest and 
trade their own money; they work for others. This creates a potential conflict of interest or agency 
problem.  This notion is developed by Dow and Gorton (1997).  They argue that churning by 
funds, which occurs when they do not become informed and want to pretend that they have, is 
“noise,” in a setting where all market participants are rational.  Among the other agents in the 
market are hedgers. Noise trading, being a manifestation of agency problems, reduces the 
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profitability of traders to the employers of the traders and money managers. But, it benefits 
hedgers who earn more when they hedge. Consequently, they hedge more, which in turn can 
support more informed fund trading.  Dow and Gorton (1997) show that a “small” amount of 
hedging demand can result in a “large” noise.  Irrationality is not needed to explain significant 




Noise traders play an essential role in modern finance theory, but their identities, motivations, and 
ability to persist remain topics of research. 
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